The End of 26 Years of LDP-Komeito CoalitionUnderstanding Japanese Politics and Elections

Introduction: Historic Coalition Dissolution and the Perspective of This Article

In October 2025, Japan reached a historic turning point with the dissolution of the LDP-Komeito coalition government after approximately 26 years. This article takes this end of the LDP-Komeito coalition as a starting point to examine Japanese political history, electoral systems, and the relationship between politics, religion, and organized voting based on factual evidence.

Note: This article does not intend to criticize or support any specific political party or individual, but rather attempts an objective analysis based on publicly available information.

📚 Structure of This Article

First, we will review the origins and historical backgrounds of both the LDP and Komeito, and organize the circumstances under which the long-term LDP-Komeito coalition was established, along with its advantages and disadvantages.

Then, we will examine the immediate factors that led to the coalition's dissolution (such as responses to political funding scandals and the rightward shift of the administration), and consider the impact of the coalition's dissolution on elections and the future prospects of both parties.

We will also address the issues of "organized mobilization" and "artificial popularity" observed in Japan's electoral landscape, exploring what kind of environment is necessary to fairly elect truly capable politicians, drawing on examples from other countries and historical perspectives.

Below, we will organize historical facts chronologically while approaching the fundamental challenges of Japanese politics and elections.

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Chapter 1: The Birth of the LDP — Conservative Merger and the Beginning of Long-Term Rule

🏛️ The Conservative Merger of 1955

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was born on November 15, 1955, when postwar conservative political forces united.

The Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party, two existing conservative parties, merged to counter the rise of the Japan Socialist Party, holding the founding convention of the Liberal Democratic Party.

Through this conservative merger, the conservative forces that had been in power came together as one major party, leading to a political structure known as the "1955 System" that would continue for approximately 40 years, characterized by LDP dominance and opposition weakness.

📜 The LDP's Principles and Strength

The founding principles of the Liberal Democratic Party were the following three:

• Anti-communism — Countering communist forces such as the Soviet Union and China
• Maintenance of parliamentary democracy — Preserving democratic political systems
• Building an independent peaceful nation — Postwar reconstruction and return to international society

At its founding, the party's strength reached approximately 300 House of Representatives members and 115 House of Councillors members, and the LDP has consistently led Japan's government from a pro-American, capitalist, and conservative standpoint.

📊 History of Long-Term Rule

• 1955-1993 — Maintained power almost exclusively (with exceptions such as brief non-LDP coalition governments like the Hosokawa administration)
• 1994 — LDP returned to power by forming a coalition with the Socialist Party and others
• 2009 — Transferred power to the Democratic Party
• 2012 — Regained power and continues to the present

The LDP maintained strong connections with both the bureaucracy and the business community, leading policies during Japan's high economic growth period while also experiencing numerous corruption scandals and factional conflicts.

Behind this long-term rule lay the LDP's powerful organizational strength and financial resources, as well as its connections with various groups. Support from corporate groups and industry associations, rural bases, personal networks, and relationships with certain religious organizations have all influenced the LDP's political dynamics.

⛪ The Relationship Between Politics and Religion (The LDP's Case)

As the long-standing ruling party, the LDP has had diverse support organizations, including religious groups.

A recent issue has been the relationship with the Unification Church (officially known as the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification).

According to reports that emerged in 2022, the party's internal investigation revealed that approximately half of LDP Diet members (179 out of 379) had some connection with the Unification Church or related organizations.

• Attending events hosted by the Unification Church
• Receiving support (mobilization and volunteers) during elections
• Receiving political donations

Examples of connections:

Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the collusion between the Unification Church and politics became a major issue, and then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida declared, "We will sever relationships with socially problematic organizations going forward".

Thus, the LDP also has connections with religious organizations, and criticism has intensified regarding the ties between the ruling party and religious groups. This issue is two sides of the same coin with the Komeito-Soka Gakkai problem discussed later.

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Chapter 2: Komeito and Soka Gakkai — Religious Organizations' Political Participation

🙏 The Birth of Soka Gakkai: Pre-war and Post-war

On the other hand, Komeito is a political party born with Soka Gakkai, a new religious organization, as its support base.

Soka Gakkai is a lay Buddhist organization in the Nichiren Buddhist tradition, founded in 1930 by educator Tsunesaburo Makiguchi and others.

Initially called "Soka Kyoiku Gakkai" (Value-Creating Education Society), it started as an educational movement. However, during wartime, Makiguchi and other leaders were suppressed and arrested for violating the Peace Preservation Law due to their opposition to the State Shinto system, and Makiguchi died in prison (1944).

After the war, Josei Toda rebuilt Soka Gakkai, rapidly increasing its membership. Under the initiative of the third president, Daisaku Ikeda (who passed away in 2023), Soka Gakkai made a full-scale entry into politics.

🗳️ Formation of Komeito and Entry into National Politics

Soka Gakkai began activities to elect its members in local elections from the 1950s, and in 1961 formed a political organization called the "Komei Political League."

Then, on November 17, 1964, under President Ikeda's leadership, the national political party "Komeito" was officially formed.

• 1964 — Komeito formed and registered as a political party with the Election Commission
• 1965 — First won seats in the national Diet in House of Councillors elections (4 seats)
• 1967 — Won 25 seats in House of Representatives elections, entering national politics
• 1969 — Won 47 seats in general elections, surpassing the Democratic Socialist Party to become the third-largest force after the Socialist Party

Komeito's Entry into National Politics (Timeline):

Supported by Soka Gakkai's organizational strength and enthusiastic support activities, Komeito rapidly rose to become the third force in the Diet within just a few years.

⚖️ Controversy Over Separation of Religion and Politics

The emergence of Komeito sparked major debate about the proper application of the principle of separation of religion and politics in Japan.

• "Religious organizations shall receive no privileges from the State"
• "No religious organization shall exercise any political authority"

Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates:

However, Soka Gakkai openly declared itself as a support base and conducted organized election campaigns for the election of Komeito politicians.

For this reason, criticism of the unity of religion and politics constantly followed, with questions like "Doesn't a religious organization supporting a specific party and exerting political influence contradict the spirit of the Constitution?"

Soka Gakkai and Komeito's Counterargument:

"The constitutional separation of religion and politics stipulates that state power should not intervene in religion; it does not prohibit religious organizations from engaging in political activities"

In fact, legally, it is not immediately illegal for religious organizations to engage in political movements or solicit votes, and Soka Gakkai maintains the position that it supports Komeito "not as a religious corporation but as a gathering of individuals."

📰 The Freedom of Speech Incident and Organizational Reform

Nevertheless, during Komeito's formative period, an incident of suppression of speech by Soka Gakkai occurred, drawing severe criticism.

• Soka Gakkai leadership interfered with publications critical of themselves
• Pressured publishers to halt the publication of critical books
• Allegedly threatened critics
• The matter was pursued in the Diet

The 1969 "Freedom of Speech and Press Suppression Incident":

Public opinion harshly condemned this as "a challenge to freedom of speech" and "political power being abused by a religious organization," and in May 1970, President Ikeda officially apologized at a Soka Gakkai general meeting.

• "Abandonment of the National Kaidan (the idea of the state building facilities for a specific religion) concept"
• "Prohibition of concurrent positions between Soka Gakkai executives and Komeito executives"

Reforms Announced by President Ikeda:

This led to a reform separating the organizations of Soka Gakkai and Komeito.

From this point on, Komeito became "a party that even non-Soka Gakkai members can join" (party regulations stipulate that anyone 18 years or older who agrees with the platform can join regardless of nationality or religion), and officially, the religious organization and political party operate as separate entities.

However, in reality, the vast majority of Komeito's national and local legislators are Soka Gakkai members, and election activities remain supported by Soka Gakkai's strong network.

🎯 Komeito's Basic Policy Line

Since its founding, Komeito has advocated the following three principles:

• Centrism — Not leaning to either extreme left or right
• Welfare Enhancement — Expansion of social security
• Pacifism — Particularly upholding Article 9 of the Constitution, which renounces war

• 1960s-1970s — Active as opposition party cooperating with progressive forces (Japan Socialist Party and Japanese Communist Party). Strengthened leftist positions such as "welfare priority" and "abolition of the Japan-US Security Treaty"
• From 1978 onward — Shifted to a realistic line accepting the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Self-Defense Forces. Positioned as a moderate conservative-leaning centrist party
• 1993 — Joined the non-LDP Hosokawa coalition government. First time Komeito ministers were appointed

Evolution of Policy Line:

At this time, Komeito shifted from opposition to become part of the ruling coalition, joining forces with non-LDP forces. However, after the short-lived Hosokawa government collapsed, Komeito did not join the LDP-Socialist Party coalition and temporarily returned to opposition.

🔄 Merger with Shinshinto and Re-formation

• 1994 — Komeito once dissolved and merged into Shinshinto (New Frontier Party, which brought together parties that participated in the Hosokawa coalition)
• End of 1997 — Shinshinto collapsed due to internal conflicts
• November 1998 — Komeito was re-formed and revived as an independent party

Following this fresh start, Komeito steered toward cooperation with the LDP.

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Chapter 3: The Formation of the LDP-Komeito Coalition and 26 Years of History

🤝 Birth of the Coalition Government in 1999

The LDP-Komeito coalition system that continues to the present officially began in 1999.

While there was cooperation behind the scenes before that, the full-scale entry into the coalition government occurred on October 5, 1999, when the "LDP-Liberal-Komeito Coalition Government" was formed under LDP Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, with the LDP, the Liberal Party (Ichiro Ozawa's Liberal Party), and Komeito.

• For Komeito, this was a return to the ruling coalition for the first time in 5 years since 1994
• The Liberal Party later left the coalition
• The LDP-Komeito coalition (LDP-Komeito coalition) continued thereafter
• Continued through the Obuchi → Mori → Koizumi administrations

Key Points:

In this coalition government, Komeito for the first time participated in government operations as part of the ruling coalition and began obtaining cabinet posts (such as Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism).

💡 Benefits for Both Parties

The LDP-Komeito coalition had clear advantages for both parties.

• Obtaining "reliable organized votes to win elections" from Komeito and Soka Gakkai
• Soka Gakkai's organized votes often serve as the decisive factor in determining LDP candidates' victory or defeat in single-member districts
• Many electoral districts nationwide where the LDP cannot maintain a stable majority without Komeito's cooperation

Benefits for the LDP:

• By entering the ruling coalition, it becomes easier to realize Komeito's policies
• Led or realized many policies, mainly in welfare and education fields

Benefits for Komeito:

• Expansion of child allowances (system established in 1972)
• Introduction of reduced tax rates during consumption tax increases (2019)
• Free early childhood education and childcare (started in 2019)

Major Policies Realized by Komeito:

Komeito also played a unique role in peace diplomacy, such as proposing normalization of relations with China and visiting China in the late 1960s, and reopening Japan-China dialogue through the visit to China by Komeito representative Natsuo Yamaguchi in 2013, serving as a bridge diplomatically as a member of the ruling coalition.

📉 Bitter Experience as Opposition Party

Another major advantage of being in the ruling coalition for Komeito was painfully realized when it became an opposition party.

• When the LDP suffered a major defeat and the Democratic Party government was born
• Komeito was dragged down and returned to opposition, with House of Representatives seats plummeting to 21
• Unable to realize its own policies, its presence diminished

Opposition Period 2009-2012:

Having experienced firsthand the decline in influence that comes with being out of the ruling coalition, Komeito immediately returned to the coalition when the LDP regained power at the end of 2012, and maintained its position in the ruling coalition from then until 2025.

Within Komeito, there is a strong belief that "without being in the ruling coalition, neither welfare realization nor a brake on pacifism can be maintained," which has been a driving force for continuing the coalition.

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Chapter 4: Electoral Cooperation Under the LDP-Komeito Coalition Government

🗳️ The Power of the Single-Member District System and Organized Votes

Electoral cooperation between the two parties is indispensable when discussing the LDP-Komeito coalition.

Since the 1994 electoral system reform, Japan's House of Representatives elections have used a system combining single-member districts and proportional representation.

• Only one person can be elected from each single-member district
• All votes for those who place second or lower become wasted votes
• In closely contested districts, victory or defeat is often decided by just a few thousand votes, or even a few hundred votes

Characteristics of the Single-Member District System:

This is where the existence of Komeito, with its reliable organized votes, becomes extremely important.

📊 Soka Gakkai's Organizational Power

Komeito (Soka Gakkai) has the power to mobilize thousands to tens of thousands of votes in each electoral district.

• Soka Gakkai members have very high voter turnout
• They engage in what's called "F-tori" (Friends vote gathering), where members solicit votes from their friends and acquaintances
• They deploy web-like election activities

Soka Gakkai's Election Activities:

The LDP has relied on these organized votes to win through closely contested districts, particularly in urban areas.

🤝 Specific Forms of Electoral Cooperation

• Refrains from fielding candidates in House of Representatives single-member districts as much as possible, supporting LDP candidates
• (However, Komeito does field its own candidates in some electoral districts)

Komeito:

• Basically does not field candidates in electoral districts where Komeito fields candidates, recommending Komeito candidates

LDP:

Through this arrangement, they avoid vote-splitting and have efficiently maximized the number of seats for both parties. This is essentially a symbiotic relationship through "vote exchange".

📈 Results from the 2024 General Election

In the most recent October 2024 House of Representatives General Election (50th General Election), the following electoral cooperation took place:

• Fielded candidates in only 11 out of 289 single-member districts nationwide
• Supported LDP candidates in the vast majority of the remaining districts

Komeito:

• Did not field its own candidates in some electoral districts where Komeito had candidates, such as in Tokyo and Osaka
• Provided backing for Komeito candidates

LDP:

• Komeito won 4 people in single-member districts (out of 11 fielded)
• Won 20 seats through proportional representation
• Total of 24 seats

Results:

While the LDP fell short of a majority in single-member districts, it managed to secure the seats necessary to maintain power when combined with Komeito's seats.

📊 The Power of Electoral Cooperation (Reality Shown by Numbers)

According to calculations by the Mainichi Shimbun, if Komeito's support were lost, approximately 25 to 45 of the 132 LDP candidates who won in single-member districts in the previous election (2024) risk losing in the next election.

• In over 30 districts nationwide, the margin of victory was within 5,000 votes
• In such close districts, the presence or absence of Soka Gakkai votes determines the outcome
• In Wakayama's 1st district, an LDP newcomer won by an ultra-narrow margin of 124 votes

Fierce Competition in the 2024 General Election:

In urban areas such as Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Osaka, where the LDP, opposition parties, and Ishin compete closely, LDP candidates are expected to struggle without Komeito votes.

💼 Takafumi Horie Episode — A Symbolic Case of Organizational Power

As an even more interesting episode, there's the story of when businessman Takafumi Horie (Horiemon) ran in a national election.

Events in the 2005 House of Representatives Election, Hiroshima 6th District:

When Horie ran as an independent (with LDP support), he made a promise of electoral cooperation with Komeito (Soka Gakkai) and called out "Vote for Komeito in the proportional representation section" during street speeches.

Then, just 30 minutes later, a large number of supporters believed to be from Soka Gakkai's women's division (many elderly women) gathered, surrounded Horie, and enthusiastically cheered him on (an anecdote Horie himself later revealed).

The organizational power of Soka Gakkai, which can instantly mobilize a cheering squad with just the phrase "Vote for Komeito in PR," becomes a powerful tailwind for candidates and can even create the impression to onlookers that the candidate is "popular."

Of course, Horie ultimately lost the election, but this anecdote has become legendary as illustrating the tremendous power of Soka Gakkai votes and mobilization.

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Chapter 5: Advantages and Disadvantages of Komeito Being in the Coalition

✅ Advantages of the Coalition for Komeito

As mentioned above, there were many advantages for Komeito being in the ruling coalition. The main ones are as follows.

(1) Enhanced Policy Realization Power

By joining the cabinet as part of the ruling coalition, Komeito gained a position where it could more easily reflect its own campaign promises in policy. Indeed, Komeito's positions such as child allowances and free education have been realized as government policies. While it's difficult for opposition parties to realize policies even if they submit bills, ruling parties can directly participate in budget compilation and bill drafting.

(2) Acting as a Brake on Policy

From its position of pacifism and emphasis on welfare, Komeito also served as a brake to restrain the LDP's excesses. For example, voices evaluate that it applied certain checks on constitutional revision, expansion of collective self-defense rights, and defense spending increases promoted by hawks within the LDP, keeping them within realistic bounds (in fact, there were years when official visits to Yasukuni Shrine by the prime minister and cabinet members were canceled due to Komeito's opposition).

(3) Securing Seats Through Electoral Cooperation

Through coordination with the LDP, Komeito candidates became more likely to win in single-member districts. While Komeito has strong organized votes, its nationwide support rate is in the single digits, making it inherently difficult to win in single-member districts. However, by creating electoral districts where the LDP doesn't field candidates (so-called "one-sided recommendation districts"), Komeito candidates can compete as unified ruling coalition candidates. Tokyo metropolitan and Kansai Komeito single-member districts are exactly this, where they've won head-to-head contests with other parties and maintained seats.

(4) Benefits of Being in the Ruling Coalition Itself

On a detailed level, being in the ruling coalition provides preferential treatment in Diet management (allocation of chairman and committee chair positions, etc.), and potential indirect benefits to the support base, Soka Gakkai. For example, there may have been situations where the ruling coalition's influence could be exercised regarding government backing for Gakkai-affiliated educational institutions and peace movements, or matters Soka Gakkai had been concerned about (such as disputes with the Agency for Cultural Affairs).

❌ Disadvantages of the Coalition for Komeito

On the other hand, disadvantages and burdens of the coalition for Komeito have also been pointed out.

(1) Getting Caught Up in LDP Scandals

When the LDP caused scandals, Komeito also received criticism as part of the ruling coalition, directly leading to declining support rates. Recently, the LDP politicians' slush fund and political funds non-reporting problem (the "Money and Politics" issue) and Unification Church problems that emerged just before the 2024 general election became headwinds, and even though Komeito was uninvolved, it received harsh judgment from voters as a member of the ruling coalition.

(2) Diminishing Distinctive Colors in Policy

As the coalition with the LDP became prolonged, criticism arose that Komeito's distinctive positions became obscured.

(3) Stagnation of Base Votes and Organizational Fatigue

Komeito's proportional representation votes decreased from nearly 9 million in the early 2000s to the 6 million range in the 2020s. Behind this are the aging of Soka Gakkai activists and young Gakkai members' detachment from politics, and in regions called "perpetually victorious Kansai," they've continued to struggle due to the rise of the Japan Innovation Party in recent years.

(4) Ideological Gap with Conservative Government

Many Soka Gakkai members who form Komeito's support base lean liberal and pacifist, and there's latent resistance to joining with the right-wing-leaning LDP. When security legislation was forcibly passed under the Abe administration, dissent reportedly erupted even from within the Gakkai, and in recent years, voices have arisen from Gakkai members saying they "can't keep up" with the LDP's eagerness for constitutional revision and military expansion.

⚖️ Dilemma and Foreshadowing of the Decision

Amid these advantages and disadvantages, Komeito has constantly faced a dilemma: whether to choose the "stability and influence" of the coalition government, or to stick to "principles and an independent line" even if it means returning to opposition.

Particularly, dissatisfaction was reportedly growing from the Soka Gakkai side that "we can no longer keep up with the increasingly right-leaning LDP", which became the foreshadowing of this coalition withdrawal.

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Chapter 6: Circumstances of Coalition Dissolution — Birth of the Takaichi Administration and Komeito's Decision

🔥 2025: The LDP-Komeito Coalition Finally Reaches a Crossroads

In 2025, the LDP-Komeito coalition finally reached a crossroads. In the October 2024 general election and the following July 2025 House of Councillors election, both the ruling LDP and Komeito suffered major defeats, resulting in the unusual situation of losing majorities in both houses.

Komeito in particular won only 8 of 14 contested seats in the 2025 House of Councillors election (21 seats total including non-contested, a historic low), and a sense of crisis spread that "continuing the coalition won't lead to party revival."

Amid this, responsibility debates erupted within the LDP, and then-Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced his intention to resign. In the fall of 2025, an LDP presidential election was held, and Sanae Takaichi was elected as the 29th party president.

Rather than the news of being the LDP's first female president, Ms. Takaichi, known as a conservative hardliner, made Komeito nervous with her political stance.

🚨 Three Concerns Presented by Komeito

Immediately after the birth of the new President Takaichi, Komeito Representative Tetsuo Saito met with Ms. Takaichi and insisted that resolving three concerns was necessary for continuing the coalition.

The three points Representative Saito presented were as follows:

(1) Accountability on "Money and Politics" Issues

Regarding the successive political funding scandals within the LDP (problems with non-reporting in political funds reports and slush fund suspicions), Komeito pointed out that "this was one cause of the ruling coalition's defeat" and demanded concrete measures such as strengthening regulations on corporate and organizational donations to restore trust. Komeito particularly strongly objected to Ms. Takaichi's statement during the presidential election that she would "not impose additional punishments on scandal-involved legislators."

(2) Historical Recognition and Yasukuni Shrine Visit Issues

Sanae Takaichi has strong hawk colors in her historical views, such as publicly stating she would visit Yasukuni Shrine on August 15th, and her stance could invite diplomatic friction with China and South Korea. Komeito, which emphasizes Japan-China friendship and stability in East Asia, expressed "deep concern" about Ms. Takaichi's historical views and stance on Yasukuni visits. They even stated it's "a matter that has led to diplomatic problems and most want to avoid."

(3) Policies on Coexistence with Foreigners

While Komeito advocates for protecting the rights of foreign residents and promoting a multicultural society, Ms. Takaichi, true to her conservative hardliner nature, tends to be passive on immigration and refugee policies, advocating for tightening restrictions on foreign workers and immigrants. Representative Saito clearly stated regarding this policy gap, "Many supporters are concerned. Without resolving these concerns, there will be no coalition government."

Representative Saito went even further, publicly stating that "unless (the LDP president) is someone who matches our conservative-centrist line, we cannot form a coalition," restraining Ms. Takaichi. This was also seen as an unusual intervention in another party's presidential election, with some criticism on social media that "Komeito is blatantly interfering" (Representative Saito explained the next day that he was "just stating general principles").

However, now that President Takaichi's birth has realized Komeito's concerns, Komeito judged it could no longer afford not to act.

📉 Structural Problems Behind Coalition Withdrawal

Finally, on October 10, 2025, Komeito officially conveyed its decision to withdraw from the coalition government with the LDP.

Representative Saito clearly stated in the prime minister nomination election that he "cannot write Sanae Takaichi's name," and Komeito made the decision to turn to opposition.

The direct trigger for coalition withdrawal was the distrust in the Takaichi administration mentioned above, but behind it also lies the structural problem of "Komeito's party decline as a result of continuing as the ruling party for 26 years."

In fact, Komeito's number of Diet members peaked at 60 (32 in the House of Representatives, 28 in the House of Councillors) in 2021, but by 2025 had decreased 25% in four years to 45 (24 in the House of Representatives, 21 in the House of Councillors). Proportional representation votes also decreased 40% from 8.62 million in 2004 to 5.21 million in 2025 when viewed long-term.

These numbers show the reality of aging Soka Gakkai members and declining organizational strength, indicating that Komeito stood at a crossroads of whether to continue riding the "sinking ship" with the LDP or distance itself temporarily to rebuild.

Representative Saito explained the decision to withdraw from the coalition as "an unavoidable choice to protect our principles." On the other hand, as a practical matter, there's no guarantee that Komeito's support base will rapidly recover just because it returned to opposition, and there's also a risk of losing influence and being buried by leaving the government.

In fact, some experts take a sober view that "even if Komeito leaves the coalition, I don't think it can recover its declining party strength." The LDP side also feels a sense of crisis that "we can't win elections like this," and Japanese politics has entered a chaotic new phase.

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Chapter 7: Prospects After Coalition Dissolution — Impact on Elections and Possibility of Political Realignment

💥 Blow to the LDP

With the LDP-Komeito split officially decided, the structure of the next House of Representatives election changes significantly.

As mentioned earlier, single-member district elections without Komeito's cooperation will be extremely tough battles for the LDP. The Mainichi Shimbun calculation of "possibility of losing 25-45 seats" means nearly 20% could be blown away from the LDP's current seats (191 LDP seats in the 2024 election).

Particularly in urban areas and the Kansai region, where there are strong rivals like Ishin and the Constitutional Democratic Party, many electoral districts may be reversed without the addition of Soka Gakkai votes.

Already within the LDP, voices are emerging saying "this is no time to be fighting with Komeito" and "can't we somehow repair the cooperative relationship?" Also, the LDP is showing moves to field its own candidates in electoral districts Komeito has protected (Komeito single-member districts in Tokyo, Osaka, etc.) as a countermeasure.

For example, in Tokyo, they're considering fielding an LDP candidate in the 12th district of Tokyo, which has been Komeito's stronghold for many years, in what could be seen as "retaliation." Such moves could deepen the rift between the two parties further, and election sites are certain to be chaotic.

🔮 Komeito's Path Forward

Komeito does not have the power to govern alone. To maintain influence as a "kingmaker" holding the casting vote going forward, it needs to join with some other party.

However, none of the currently conceivable options are easy.

Alliance with Other Conservative Parties

Scenarios of joining with the Japan Innovation Party or Democratic Party for the People instead of the LDP are also being discussed, but are said to carry large risks for Komeito. Ishin is becoming Komeito's nemesis in Osaka (in Osaka, the LDP, Komeito, and Democrats long divided territory, but recently Ishin has begun fielding opposing candidates against Komeito candidates and eroding their stronghold), and if Komeito forms a coalition with Ishin, Komeito could conversely be driven out in Kansai.

The Democratic Party for the People is policy-wise close to Komeito's centrist line, but if the Democratic Party for the People also enters the ruling coalition, Komeito's necessity could diminish and its presence as "the core of centrist forces" could fade. Above all, since neither Ishin nor the Democratic Party for the People has organized votes like Komeito, the value of Komeito votes could be diluted (they were valued precisely because they joined with the LDP, a strong party).

Alliance with Opposition Forces

Forming alliances with traditional leading opposition parties like the Constitutional Democratic Party is also practically difficult in reality. Ideologically, the Constitutional Democrats and Komeito have some commonalities (cautious about constitutional revision, liberal-leaning), but the relationship between Constitutional Democratic supporters and Soka Gakkai members is tenuous, making electoral cooperation effects unpredictable. Also, since Soka Gakkai has long been in an adversarial relationship with the Communist Party, alliance is impossible. Therefore, the general view is that a scenario where Komeito enters a corner of an opposition coalition government is currently hard to imagine.

Approaching the LDP Again

Ironically, the path for Komeito to maintain influence may be to "join hands with the LDP again." However, this would require a change in the LDP's line. This time, behind Komeito's decision was the existence of Ms. Takaichi, a symbolic hawkish leader. If the LDP president changes to a more moderate person in the future and a policy agreement can be made that Komeito can feel comfortable with, the possibility of re-coalition cannot be denied. Since politics is a world of realistic give-and-take, it's hard to think Komeito would remain in opposition permanently, and it will likely seek to participate in government in some form eventually.

However, when and in what form that will be is unclear. As Komeito itself has stated that "coalition withdrawal is extremely difficult," there's ample possibility of returning to a realistic line.

In any case, Japan's political map is being redrawn significantly by this LDP-Komeito split. Will the LDP, as the first party, weaken and be replaced by some other rising force? Will the Japan Innovation Party or Constitutional Democratic Party grow? Or will the LDP maintain a majority by forming new alliances with parties like the Democratic Party for the People? Komeito will seek a position where it can exercise influence while avoiding isolation as a minor opposition party. Some experts voice that "there's no choice but to dissolve the House and ask the people's will in a general election," and attention is focused on what judgment voters will make in a general election in the near future.

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Chapter 8: The Front and Back of Elections — The Merits and Demerits of Organized Mobilization and "Artificial Popularity"

We've looked at the LDP-Komeito coalition and electoral cooperation so far, but these are deeply related to fundamental problems that Japan's elections face.

Namely, the problem of "apparent popularity" and "organizational campaigning" in elections.

🎭 The Reality of Mobilization and Staged Popularity

As symbolized by the Horie episode mentioned at the beginning, politicians sometimes resort to any means, including mobilization and staging, to win elections. The sight of large crowds gathering during election campaigns gives voters the impression that "that candidate is popular" or "has momentum."

However, there are often "shills" (mobilized supporters) mixed in among those audiences. Not just Soka Gakkai members, but other politicians' local support groups also commonly mobilize supporters en masse to rush to street speeches. This phenomenon is seen in elections worldwide, not just Japan, but the problem is that it's not an indicator of the essential size of support.

🧠 Psychology of the Bandwagon Effect

As human psychology, people tend to "think something is good if many people support it" (bandwagon effect). For example, when seeing a politician with many SNS followers or a speech video with many YouTube views, people tend to think "they must be an excellent person since they're receiving so much attention."

However, conversely, even if an unknown newcomer candidate has excellent policy vision or character, if they have few followers and sparse meetings, they'll end up going unnoticed by many voters. This is exactly the same as "no matter how good the content is, it won't be appreciated if it's not played," and the opportunity for voters to know about candidates becomes biased.

🎯 The Reality: Money, Organization, and Name Recognition Trump Ability

In the current electoral system, name recognition and organizational power overwhelmingly dominate. Incumbents who appear on TV, celebrity candidates, candidates who receive endorsements from major parties and have their posters displayed in large numbers, candidates with strong local bases and support organizations (labor unions, industry groups, religious organizations, etc.) all have huge advantages at the starting line.

In contrast, when independents or newcomers from minor parties challenge with nothing, it's hard for it to be a fair fight in reality. "Whether one has organization, money, and name recognition" rather than "whether one is truly excellent as a politician" often determines victory or defeat in many situations.

🤔 How Can We Create Fair Elections?

In response to this reality, the fundamental question underlying this theme is "Can't we create elections where capable politicians can compete fairly without being buried?"

For example, in school student council elections, all candidates are given opportunities to speak in front of all students, and each can appeal fairly (although popularity and factions still have influence even in school elections).

Ideally, all candidates would be given equal presentation opportunities and time, and all voters would make judgments after seeing them. However, in reality, it's nearly impossible to have all candidates' positions thoroughly heard by over 100 million voters, and only fragmentary information reaches them through media and the internet.

Furthermore, not all voters actively collect information because they're busy or have little interest in politics. As a result, many people tend to decide who to vote for based on images, atmosphere, or party names.

💰 Challenges of Money-Free, Clean Elections

There are also issues regarding money-free, clean elections. Even now, the Public Offices Election Law stipulates certain spending limits (upper limits on election expenses) and prohibits vote buying, but in reality, enormous amounts of money move in elections.

From campaign cars to poster printing to personnel costs, candidates and parties cannot conduct sufficient election campaigns without abundant financial resources. This is where the structure of politicians rushing to raise money and relying on companies, organizations, and sometimes religious groups emerges.

As a system to appeal to all voters without spending money and guaranteeing opportunities, there are ideas like holding debates with all candidates on public broadcasters like NHK or enhancing information disclosure through election bulletins and online.

In fact, Japan has NHK conduct political broadcasts and distributes election bulletins (booklets containing candidates' policies) to each household. However, it's questionable how many voters eagerly watch these, and there are also criticisms that complete neutral reporting is difficult (there are also criticisms that NHK, though a public broadcaster, may lean toward the government).

💻 Internet, SNS, and New Possibilities

The internet and SNS are means by which individual candidates can disseminate information at lower cost compared to traditional media. In recent years, more politicians have distributed speech videos on YouTube and engaged in debates on Twitter (X). There have been examples of those who gained attention through SNS and won elections, showing some possibility.

However, online spaces are also mixed quality, and methods to gather attention tend to be prioritized. Making controversial statements to go viral or earning view counts with elaborately staged videos doesn't necessarily correlate with a politician's qualifications. Rather, there's a danger that inflammatory individuals may gather attention.

In the end, it's important for each voter to have the judgment to decide "what criteria to use for voting." Even though it's the same one vote, there are votes cast after thoroughly reading and comparing policies, and votes cast simply because someone is famous. In democracy, both are equal, and this sometimes leads to the harm of populism (becoming a popularity contest).

📚 Historical Perspectives on Democracy

This problem has actually been pointed out since ancient times. The ancient Greek philosopher Plato was skeptical of democracy, warning that "the masses are easily deceived by demagogues."

In Japanese history, there was no electoral system before the Edo period, but village communities had council-based systems where leaders were decided through meetings. In small-scale societies, leaders were selected based on reputation and trust, as people knew each other's characters directly.

However, in modern large-scale societies, there are no politicians we know directly, and we inevitably must judge based on images through media and rumors. From a human history perspective, methods for selecting "good leaders" at a scale of tens of millions of people are a continuous trial and error process. Democracy is said to be the best available but not perfect system precisely because it doesn't provide complete fairness or correct answers.

🌟 Pursuing Ideals While Being Realistic

That said, pursuing ideals is also important. Ideal elections are states where candidates compete based on their abilities (quality of policies, character, track record), and voters calmly discern and judge these.

And as a result, the majority of voters can be satisfied that "we can entrust this person," electing leaders. Rather than winners being predetermined by money and organizational power, each person's conscientious vote accumulates to reflect the people's will—this may be idealistic, but it's worth aiming for.

🌍 Examples of Reforms in Other Countries

For example, some countries attempt to correct disparities between candidates by investing tax money in election campaigns through public funding. Countries like the UK and Canada legally set upper limits on election spending to prevent excessive spending.

Japan also has a political party subsidy system, and improvements have been made such as giving newcomers certain TV political broadcast opportunities. However, fundamental disparities (name recognition and organization) remain.

Also, as a device in the electoral system itself, if proportional representation is expanded, seat allocation becomes based on each party's vote share, so wasted votes decrease and it approaches more accurate reflection of the people's will.

In fact, Komeito is stronger in proportional representation than in single-member districts, so if the system centered on proportional representation, they could obtain seats according to their organized votes without needing to defer to the LDP. However, single-member district systems also have advantages of stabilizing governments, so every country is experimenting.

🤖 Future Possibilities with Technology

Technically, future scenarios are also conceivable, such as making national elections internet voting to reduce costs, and using AI to create platforms where candidates' positions can be compared.

If there were matching systems where voters input their values and policy priorities and are shown candidates with the closest positions, people might be able to choose without relying on name recognition. However, ultimately, something that makes people think "I want to entrust this person" (charisma, sincerity, judgment, etc.) is also important, so there are elements that cannot be measured by numbers alone.

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Conclusion: Political Challenges and Prospects Visible from Coalition Dissolution

🔍 Structural Problems of Japanese Politics

The drama of the LDP-Komeito coalition dissolution highlighted structural problems in Japanese politics.

One is that when calculated party cooperation relationships for maintaining power continue for long periods, the essence of politics (principles and policies) tends to become secondary. Komeito nearly lost its raison d'être while in the coalition for many years, and dissatisfaction erupted even from Soka Gakkai members.

The LDP also became dependent on its partner Komeito and developed a constitution where it cannot fight without organized votes. While coalition dissolution brings pain to both sides, it also serves as an opportunity for each to return to their origins and face their beliefs and supporters' voices.

🗳️ Challenges in Japan's Electoral System and Culture

Another issue is the challenges facing Japan's electoral system and culture. The question is whether we can truly elect good politicians in elections where organized votes and popularity-seeking dominate, and whether individual voters have sufficient material for judgment.

In Japan, where low voter turnout continues, apathy is also problematized, with attitudes like "it's the same whoever does it" and "no expectations from politics." As stated in this article, there's ample room for improvement in terms of electoral fairness and voter education.

For example, small accumulations are needed, such as raising political literacy through school education, enhancing debate programs, and making it easier to access beneficial political information online.

💡 An Opportunity for Japanese Voters to Think

The major incident of LDP-Komeito coalition dissolution also gives Japanese voters an opportunity to think. People not well-versed in politics may have developed interest from news, wondering "What does it mean that Komeito, which was in the ruling coalition, becomes opposition?" or "Did Soka Gakkai's organized votes have that much influence?"

If people further delve in, thinking "What criteria should I use for my one vote?" and "Let's look at substance rather than superficial popularity," democracy becomes one step healthier.

👤 The Importance of Politicians' Individual Qualities

Finally, what I want to emphasize is the importance of politicians' individual qualities. Not just superficial support thickness or flashy performances, but their principles, policies, execution ability, and humanity determine political results.

We voters should not be swayed just by mobilized large crowds or SNS follower counts, but should listen to each candidate's words and track records. This is because having the eye to discern who will truly improve our lives is the shortcut to realizing good politics.

🌅 Toward a Healthier Democracy

The end of over 20 years of cooperation between the LDP and Komeito is a marker of one era. At the same time, it can be said to be a touchstone that will determine how Japan's politics and elections will change going forward.

By each of us citizens maintaining interest in how politics should be and continuing to demand the realization of fair and meaningful elections, can't we advance toward healthier democracy? I hope that this incident serves as an opportunity for Japanese politics to regain fundamental trust.

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References

This article was written based on news articles from various news agencies and expert analyses. Information on the LDP-Komeito coalition dissolution was cited from Reuters and various columns, and objective facts about Komeito and Soka Gakkai's history and electoral data were referenced from party history articles and Wikipedia, among others.

Each cited section is based on reliable sources and reflects the latest information available (as of October 15, 2025). Where points were unclear, definitive statements were avoided and only factual relationships were described. I hope this article as a whole serves as an aid to providing a fair and neutral perspective on Japan's political situation.